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FORTUITY VICTIMS AND THE COMPENSATION GAP: 
RE-ENVISIONING LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE 
FOR INTENTIONAL AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
 
ERIK S. KNUTSEN†1 
 
*** 
 Insurance is based on the notion that only uncertain, or fortuitous, 
losses are insurable.  There are systemic problems, however, with the 
consistency in which fortuity clauses are applied in the liability insurance 
context.  Differing interpretive approaches and litigation distortions 
include the use of at least three interpretive perspectives and two 
substantive requirements to interpret the intentional act fortuity clause, and 
four interpretive perspectives to interpret the criminal act fortuity clause. 
These problems stem from the tension between the two purposes of liability 
insurance (wealth protection and victim compensation) coupled with a 
move from explanatory rhetoric about fortuity to explanatory rhetoric 
about morality.   
 This Article outlines the importance of balancing that tension and 
examines the problematic effects of these two ubiquitous fortuity clauses 
that remove coverage for policyholders and simultaneously deny access to 
compensatory funds for injured victims.  The Article argues that intentional 
and criminal act fortuity clauses need to be more consistently interpreted to 
avoid a host of inefficient distortion effects that otherwise result from the 
introduction of moral concerns, and it concludes by offering possible 
solutions for redress for those accident victims that would still be left, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It surprises many that an accident victim who is hurt as a result of a 
wrongdoer’s intentional or criminal actions often receives no compensation 
from a tort lawsuit.  In fact, tort lawsuits are rarely brought for these kinds 
of injuries.  The reason is because the wrongdoer’s liability insurance 
policy typically excludes insurance coverage for losses arising from the 
wrongdoer policyholder’s intentional or criminal actions.  There is thus no 
money available for the victim’s compensation.  These are often the most 
morally disturbing kinds of injuries because, in most instances, the 
wrongdoer meant to harm the victim.  It was no “accident.”  So why does 
liability insurance pay an injured accident victim when the policyholder 
causes an accident but not when the policyholder acts intentionally or 
criminally?  More importantly, what if the policyholder acted intentionally 
or criminally and still caused an “accident?”  
What if the policyholder did not mean to harm the victim?  This 
can occur in a variety of ways.  A policyholder could be playing a prank to 
scare a friend.  The prank gets out of hand and the friend is injured.  But the 
policyholder never means to harm the friend.  Did the policyholder act 
“intentionally” and therefore there should be no liability insurance 
coverage available to him if the friend sues him for compensation?  What if 
the policyholder’s actions violate a criminal law and the policyholder is 
charged with a crime arising out of the prank behavior?  Should there be no 
liability insurance coverage then?  And what is the injured friend to do for 
compensation, without the policyholder’s financial safety net of liability 
insurance to access? 
This Article examines the problematic effects of two ubiquitous 
fortuity clauses in liability insurance: a clause which removes coverage for 
intentionally caused losses and one which removes coverage for losses 
arising from a policyholder’s criminal acts.  A fortuity clause is insurance 
policy language designed to remove coverage for non-fortuitous risks.  The 
fortuity clause controls access to insurance coverage for a liability 
insurance policyholder while simultaneously controlling access to 
compensatory funds for the injured accident victim who sues the 
wrongdoer policyholder.  
Intentional and criminal act fortuity clauses are interpreted in a 
highly inconsistent fashion by courts and litigators, making insurance cases 
hinging on the clauses costly and unpredictable to litigate.  Litigants have 
also devised creative but costly litigation distortions as workarounds for 
avoiding the operation of these clauses.  This, in turn, has resulted in a 
large group of injured accident victims who face a compensation gap as a 
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result of courts’ and litigants’ inconsistent fortuity clause interpretation. 
The population of accident victims within the compensation gap is 
constantly expanding and contracting with the whims of varying fortuity 
clause interpretations.  These accident victims are “fortuity victims.”  This 
makes finding a solution to this compensation gap doubly problematic for 
this group of injured accident victims because it is difficult to categorize, at 
any one time, which victims will be left uncompensated.  While liability 
insurance does not, and cannot, provide coverage for every loss, there is 
something slippery about the fact that identically-worded fortuity clauses 
are interpreted to have different effects in different cases, despite 
remarkably similar factual circumstances in those cases. 
Interpreting fortuity clauses in the liability insurance context is 
unpredictably problematic because the interpretive exercise is affected by 
the tension between two co-existing purposes of liability insurance: wealth 
protection and accident compensation.  These purposes often cancel each 
other out, leaving the injured accident victim without compensation – a 
serious collateral effect.  At the same time, because these fortuity clauses 
target intentional and criminal conduct, there is incentive for improper and 
misleading introduction of moral concerns into the interpretation.  The 
fortuity clause can morph into a morality clause, with a host of inefficient 
distortion effects.  To avoid these problems, there should be a more 
consistent interpretive solution which firmly grounds the intentional and 
criminal act fortuity clauses in fortuity concepts, not morality concepts.  
This would go a long way to bettering the accident compensation system as 
a whole by removing the unpredictability about which fortuity victims are 
left in the compensation gap.  Once that occurs, there can then be a more 
efficient accounting as to where certain societal losses will ultimately lie –
 with insurers, wrongdoers, or society’s social safety net.  
Part I of this Article explains how fortuity is fundamental to the 
insurance relationship.  Insurance can only insure against uncertain risks. 
Part II explains how liability insurance operates within the tort system and 
introduces the tension between liability insurance’s two often-competing 
purposes: a wealth protection vehicle for the policyholder and a vital and 
expected component of society’s accident compensation web.  In Part III, 
the Article focuses on two common liability insurance fortuity clauses, the 
intentional and criminal act fortuity clauses.  The problems created by 
courts’ and litigants’ current interpretation of these fortuity clauses is dealt 
with in Part IV.  Part V explains the causes of these problems, tracing how 
the historically moral nature of the clauses affects their interpretation in 
today’s modern insurance world, which is focused on risk management, not 
morality.  Part VI introduces an interpretive solution for the intentional and 
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criminal act fortuity clauses.  Part VII addresses some possibilities for 
redress for those accident victims still left in the liability insurance 
compensation gap after the solution is applied.  Part VIII concludes with a 
reminder that better predictability and consistency in insurance coverage 
results can be maintained if fortuity clauses remain grounded in fortuity, 
not morality. 
 
II. INSURANCE AND FORTUITY 
 
A standard tenet of insurance is that it is designed to protect a 
policyholder against losses that are fortuitous.2 It is typically not 
economically sensible for insurers to offer protection for losses that are 
certain to happen.3 The insurance arrangement between insurer and 
policyholder depends on the insurer shouldering some potential risk that a 
future covered event may or may not occur.  The insurer profits from the 
superior ability to better estimate the likelihood of a future payout-
triggering occurrence and balance that risk with the amount of insurance 
premium charged to the policyholder who wishes her risk to be 
underwritten by the insurer.  The premium paid is usually a fraction of the 
actual cost of a future expected loss.  By pooling together multiple 
policyholders who wish similar risks underwritten, the insurer is able to 
ride the waves of random (or fortuitous) future payouts and, owing to the 
law of large numbers, profit from the fact that not everyone will experience 
a payout-triggering loss at once.  The insurer is thus taking on two risks: (1) 
                                                                                                                          
2 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS 37–68 (3d ed. 
2006); Kenneth S. Abraham, Peril and Fortuity in Property and Liability 
Insurance, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 777, 777 (2001); James A. Fischer, The Exclusion 
from Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: 
A Policy in Search of a Justification, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 96 (1990); 
George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1020–
25 (1989); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 771, 
789 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Gen. Housewares Corp. v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 741 N.E.2d 
408, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); United Capitol Ins. Co. v. Hoodco, Inc., 974 
S.W.2d 572, 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Travis, 68 S.W.3d 72, 
75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 998 
P.2d 856, 878–79 (Wash. 2000). 
3 Indeed, some states have statutory prohibitions against insurance coverage 
for willful acts. See CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 2013) (“An insurer is not liable 
for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured; but he [the insurer] is not 
exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured’s agents or others.”). 
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the risk of a future event occurring, which would trigger payout to a 
policyholder, and (2) the risk that not every policyholder in the risk pool 
will require a payout at once. 
The insurer’s risk shouldering in exchange for a policyholder’s 
premium breaks down as a commercially sensible arrangement if a 
policyholder attempts to have an insurer underwrite a risk that the 
policyholder knows he is certain to realize.  In that case, there is no risk 
transfer at all.  In exchange for a small fraction of the cost of the loss, the 
policyholder would be made whole because the insurer makes up the 
difference.  No insurer could profit from that arrangement.  To that end, 
insurance is based on the notion that insurable risks must be uncertain, or 
fortuitous, ones. 
 
III. WHAT IS LIABILITY INSURANCE? 
 
Most liability insurance policies marketed today provide a 
policyholder with coverage for a wide variety of loss-causing behavior.  
Standard liability insurance policies include homeowners’ policies which 
protect the policyholder from liability for a broad spectrum of potential 
losses, commercial liability policies which provide protection against 
liability resulting from business operations, and automobile liability 
policies which protect drivers from legal liability for accidents that result 
from use of their vehicle.  Liability insurance can be understood as a kind 
of “tort” insurance, or “behavior” insurance.4 If the policyholder does 
something (like a tort) that results in her being sued by another third party 
for losses she caused, liability insurance steps in to do two things.  First, it 
provides for a legal defense for the policyholder.  Second, if, as a result of 
the lawsuit, the policyholder is found legally liable to pay for the loss to a 
third party, the liability insurance policy provides funds to compensate that 
wronged third party, up to the financial limits of the policy.  Liability 
insurance provides policyholders protection against paying for both 
property and personal injury damages to a third party.  The focus in this 
Article is on personal injury cases where the policyholder has injured a 
third party victim.  However, the same issues arise when policyholders 
become legally liable to pay for third party property damages.  The 
compensatory gap issues are, however, markedly different (and arguably 
less compelling) in property loss instances.  The injury is then not one of 
                                                                                                                          
4 Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for 
Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 963 (2010). 
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loss of life and limb, but of property.  Society’s web of accident 
compensation sources does not really attempt to address property losses in 
a holistic fashion. 
A key notion for this Article is that, although the liability insurance 
policy is marketed and drafted by the insurer to protect the policyholder 
from legal liability to a third party, the financial payout from the liability 
insurance policy ultimately goes to the third party victim who suffered the 
loss at the hands of the policyholder.  If John’s negligence results in him 
injuring Mary and thus he is liable to pay for Mary’s injury, John’s liability 
insurer pays Mary compensation for her injury.  This mechanism creates a 
tension as to the purpose of liability insurance itself.  Is liability insurance 
to be merely a wealth protection mechanism for the insured policyholder, 
so that, in the event he is sued for some loss-causing behavior, he does not 
have to call upon his own assets (if any) to pay for the loss?  Or is liability 
insurance instead to be the largest player in the broader societal web of 
accident compensation in that it often acts as the sole source of reparation 
for an injured victim?5 This tension becomes relevant when courts attempt 
to discern whether or not a policyholder has coverage under an insurance 
policy, because the effect of that decision is ultimately felt not only by the 
policyholder (and sometimes not at all, if the policyholder is impecunious), 
but by the wronged accident victim seeking redress.  It is most stark when 
the victim suffers personal injuries and often has nowhere satisfactory to 
turn to for much-needed compensation. 
The coverage provided by liability insurance policies is typically 
very broad.6 For example, the coverage clause in a liability insurance 
policy usually provides coverage for all damages or injury for which the 
policyholder becomes “legally obligated to pay.”  This breadth of coverage 
makes sense because there are a myriad of combinations of human 
behavior that could lead up to a policyholder’s legal liability to pay for a 
third party’s loss.  To that end, because liability insurance provides such 
broad-spectrum coverage, insurers must rely on wording within the 
insurance policy to delineate what categories of behaviors or losses are not 
covered.  Of course, insurers wish to exclude losses that result from non-
                                                                                                                          
5 See generally Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways 
that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005). 
6 See, e.g., Klepper v. ACE American Ins. Co., 999 N.E.2d 86, 91 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2013) (“[We] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this 
insurance applies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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fortuitous events because these events frustrate the fundamental nature of 
the insurance arrangement.7 
 
IV. FORTUITY CLAUSES 
 
Two categories of losses that are commonly excluded from 
standard liability insurance coverage are losses resulting from the 
intentional acts or from the criminal acts of the policyholder.  These losses 
can be excluded using variously worded insurance clauses.  These “fortuity 
clauses”8 are ultimately aimed at targeting behavior that undermines the 
risk-sharing relationship between insurer and policyholder.  A fortuity 
clause delineates those certain categories of behavior that produce non-
fortuitous, and thus uninsurable, losses.  The fortuity clause most prevalent 
in liability insurance policies is an “intentional act” fortuity clause, which 
excludes from coverage those losses “either expected or intended from the 
standpoint of the insured.”9 Alternatively, the intentional act fortuity clause 
could be worded as to remove coverage for losses resulting from a 
policyholder’s intentional acts.10 Occasionally, the removal of coverage for 
intentional acts could be through reference to a definition contained in the 
liability policy’s coverage clause.  Some liability policies provide coverage 
for legal liability resulting from an “occurrence,” which is then typically 
defined as an “accident.”11 The policy then excludes intentionally caused 
                                                                                                                          
7 See, e.g., Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1047 (Colo. 2011) 
(finding intentional act exclusions necessary for insurers in setting rates and 
providing coverage and that the purpose of insurance is violated should 
policyholder be allowed to intentionally control losses). 
8 See generally Erik S. Knutsen, Fortuity Clauses in Liability Insurance: 
Solving Coverage Dilemmas for Intentional and Criminal Conduct, 37 QUEEN’S 
L.J. 73 (2011). 
9 See, e.g., Capano Mgmt. Co. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323 
(D. Del. 1999) (noting that the “expected or intended” element of the exclusion is 
at issue); see also Hirst v. Thieneman, 2004-0750, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/18/05); 
905 So. 2d 343, 351 (noting that the “expected or intended” exclusion is 
commonly referred to as the “intentional act” exclusion). 
10 See, e.g., Thomas v. Benchmark Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 438, 442 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2006) (holding that an automobile liability policy excludes “damage or injury 
‘caused intentionally’”); see also Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 170 F. Supp. 
2d 618, 621 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding coverage is excluded if insured acted “with 
the intent to cause a loss”). 
11 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Doe, 946 P.2d 1333, 1335 (Idaho 
1997) (holding that a homeowner’s liability policy provided coverage for “personal 
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losses.  In this fashion, insurers fold an exclusion into the definition of 
words used in a coverage clause: “occurrence” or “accident.”  
The second common fortuity clause is a “criminal act” fortuity 
clause which removes coverage for losses resulting from a policyholder’s 
criminal act, 12 “violation of a penal statute or ordinance,” or some criminal 
conduct.13 
At first blush, losses resulting from criminal and intentional acts of 
the policyholder may appear to be among the most fortuity-frustrating 
kinds of behavior that an insurer would want to avoid insuring.  A death 
resulting from a premeditated murder or a burned factory resulting from a 
premeditated arson hardly appear to be fortuitous events.  Surely the 
policyholder has control over whether the loss transpires or not.  But what 
about losses arising when the policyholder is criminally negligent while 
causing a loss such that she attracts a criminal charge for substandard 
behavior, like negligently handling a firearm and an accidental discharge 
harms a third party?14 Are those losses really “criminal” and thus non-
fortuitous and uninsurable?  Or what about losses arising from a prank 
                                                                                                                          
injury” caused by an “occurrence” (which is then defined as an “accident”) but 
finding an exclusion if policyholder acted with “intent to cause personal injury”); 
see also Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1262–63 (N.J. 1992) 
(finding that homeowners’ liability policy covered legal liability arising from an 
occurrence (which is defined as an “accident”) and finding that coverage excluded 
that of “insureds whose conduct is intentionally-wrongful”).  
12 Cf. Wilshire Ins. Co. v. S.A., 227 P.3d 504, 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); 
SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008). 
13 See, e.g., Wilderman v. Powers, 956 A.2d 613, 616 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) 
(finding no coverage when occurrence is the result of a “violation of a penal law or 
ordinance . . . .”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Condon, 839 N.E.2d 464, 469 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (finding no coverage when occurrence is the result of a 
“willful violation of a penal statute.”); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zavala, 302 F. 
Supp. 2d 1108, 1124 (D. Ariz. 2003) (finding no coverage when an occurrence is 
the result of a “violation of any criminal law for which any insured is 
convicted[.]”). 
14 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Berube, 854 A.2d 53, 54–55 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2004) (taking a loaded, sawed-off rifle to bed with his wife and two-month-old 
daughter and unintentionally shooting his wife); Auto Club Group Ins. Co. v. 
Booth, 797 N.W.2d 695, 696–97 (Mich. App. 2010) (injuring another teen where 
firearm accidentally discharged); Eichmanis v. Wawanesa Mut. Ins. Co. (2007), 
278 D.L.R. 4th 15, para. 9 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (playing with a firearm when it 
accidentally discharges, teen injures another teen). 
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where a policyholder intends to scare a third party and that third party gets 
injured?  Does the “intentional act” fortuity clause oust coverage when the 
policyholder subjectively acts with intent to cause a loss, or is an objective 
or some hybrid standard to be used?  For example, if a college student’s 
friends pile toilet paper on the sleeping student and then light the paper on 
fire as a prank, but the student is injured, are those losses really 
“intentional” or “expected” and thus non-fortuitous and uninsurable?15  
 
V. PROBLEMS: UNPREDICTABILITY AND COMPENSATION 
GAPS 
 
The examples above highlight the two major problems with the 
ways the intentional and criminal act fortuity clauses are interpreted by 
courts, insurers, and policyholders attempting to solve insurance coverage 
disputes.  The first problem is that past courts’ interpretations of the clauses 
have often led to unpredictable and inconsistent results.  There are opposite 
case outcomes for similar cases featuring similarly worded fortuity clauses.  
For example, some courts have held that a policyholder’s act of self-
defense which injures a third party is not covered behavior by a liability 
policy because the policyholder has intended to injure the victim.16 Other 
courts, however, have held that self-defense bars the application of an 
intentional acts fortuity clause.17 Some of these courts have also determined 
that coverage will be ousted for “unreasonable acts” of self-defense.18  
                                                                                                                          
15 See generally Godonoaga v. Khatambakhsh (2000), 188 D.L.R. 4th 706 
(Can. Ont. C.A.) (concluding that fortuity clause did not exclude coverage for 
parents’ negligent actions in allowing children to commit intentional assault).   
16 See, e.g., L.A. Checker Cab Co-op., Inc. v. First Specialty Ins. Co., 112 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 335, 337–38 (2010) (finding loss to be intentional, and thus excluded, 
where cab driver believed he had to defend himself and as such he shot passenger 
who provoked him). 
17 See, e.g., Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417, 420–21 (S.C. 
1994) (finding no intent to injure when policyholder defended himself in fist fight 
because he was only trying to protect himself); see also Farmers & Mechanics 
Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 810 (W. Va. 2001) (finding loss 
resulting from self-defense “not expected or intended by the policyholder”). 
18 See, e.g., Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 538 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1995) (denying coverage where policyholder shot a man who acted in an 
aggressively frightening manner and who climbed the policyholder’s wall and 
finding policyholder did not act reasonably as the aggressor was unarmed and 
police were not called). 
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Unpredictability is harmful for the insurer, the policyholder, and 
the wronged accident victim.  If no one can tell, up front, when a fortuity 
clause in a liability insurance policy will or will not oust coverage for a 
loss, litigation can become protracted and expensive as each party attempts 
to stress a different interpretation of the same clause.  Insurers are thus 
often unable to predict both their financial exposure on an individual basis 
for these types of losses and additionally their exposure over a large risk 
pool.  Policyholders are often unable to predict what types of behavior will 
remove coverage for a loss, thus making it difficult for them to adjust their 
actions so they remain covered for potential legal liability.  Wronged 
accident victims are unable to predictably expect compensation because the 
question is too often driven by an insurance lawsuit about the 
policyholder’s liability insurance coverage.  This has resulted in increased 
litigation costs for all parties involved and has prompted inefficient 
litigation workarounds that attempt to circumvent the unpredictable 
application of these clauses. 
The second problem with interpreting fortuity clauses is that many 
courts are ignoring the fact that the wronged accident victim’s expected 
compensation hangs in the balance in virtually every decision about 
fortuity clauses and insurance coverage.  When these clauses are triggered 
and payment is denied to a policyholder, and thus to an injured victim, the 
compensatory gap left is not routinely addressed anywhere else in the 
patchwork web of sources comprising the accident compensation system.19  
Those accident costs do not disappear simply because a policyholder is 
denied coverage.  They must be absorbed elsewhere, and often in very 
inefficient ways.  Therefore, any denial of liability insurance coverage 
needs to be done in a principled and measured fashion, carefully weighed 
against its effect on the wronged accident victim who likely will have few 
avenues to turn to for financial assistance.  To that end, it becomes 
important to develop a better way to deal with fortuity clauses which 
produces predictable and fair results for policyholders, insurers, and 
accident victims. 
 
                                                                                                                          
19 See Ellen S. Pryor, Part of the Whole: Tort Law’s Compensatory Failures 
Through a Wider Lens, 27 REV. LITIG. 307, 317–18 (2008); see also Erik S. 
Knutsen, Five Things Wrong with Personal Injury Litigation (And What to Do 
About It!), 40 ADVOCATES Q. 492, 495–96 (2013). 




Unpredictability breeds litigation.  Many litigants disputing fortuity 
clause interpretations – insurers and policyholders alike – are incentivized 
to remain in litigation up to the appeals stage because of the possibility that 
they will obtain an interpretive finding favorable to them.  This costly 
unpredictability is exacerbated in the fortuity clause context in two ways: 
interpretive unpredictability and litigation distortion from costly 
workarounds. 
 
1.   Interpretive Unpredictability 
 
a.   Intentional Act Fortuity Clause 
 
Courts attempting to apply the intentional act fortuity clause to 
make coverage determinations have devised three very different ways of 
interpreting this clause, each with differing coverage results.  This has 
occurred despite a major rewording of the standard clause in most 
commercial general liability policies in an attempt to address this very 
problem.  Once worded as an “intentional acts” exclusion, the CGL fortuity 
clause now ousts coverage for losses “expected or intended” from the 
standpoint of the policyholder.20 
Some courts interpreting the intentional act fortuity clause utilize 
an objective interpretive perspective.  This perspective removes liability 
insurance coverage if a reasonable policyholder should have known that 
damage or injury would result from her conduct.21 This perspective is 
problematic because it ousts coverage for behavior that some policyholders 
clearly expect would not lead to damage or injury (or they probably would 
                                                                                                                          
20 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 2, at 73; see also infra p. 14. 
21 See, e.g., Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Puig, 64 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518–19 (D. Md. 
1999) (finding no coverage because, even if policyholder subjectively did not 
intend injury when he kicked in a washroom stall door to deliver a “wake-up call” 
to the occupant, it was “reasonably expected” that door would hit and injure 
occupant); Scott v. Allstate Indem. Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (N.D. Ohio 
2006) (finding no coverage where policyholder held a match to a wet substance to 
see if it is flammable because it should be reasonably expected that fire would 
result); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Moore, No. 266721, 2006 WL 891078, at *1, *2–
*3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2006) (finding no coverage when child lit a lighter near 
gasoline-soaked pants, even though intent was to light a fire near leg, because fire 
was natural, foreseeable, and anticipated consequence of actions). 
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not have behaved that way in the first place).  A policyholder cannot adjust 
ex ante her behavior to avoid losing insurance coverage if she cannot 
reliably predict what behavior leads to coverage loss.  In operation, the 
clause therefore removes coverage for some behavior that is risky and 
fortuitous but not subjectively intentional.  Because liability insurance is 
supposed to provide coverage for fortuitous behavior, this is an 
incongruous result.22 
Some courts appear to apply a middle-ground hybrid interpretive 
perspective, where coverage is ousted when the policyholder intended 
some injury, but the resulting loss was greater than expected.23 This 
perspective exhibits the same problem as the objective interpretive 
perspective but on a sliding scale.  Once the policyholder’s conduct is 
judged by objective reasonable standards, some fortuitous conduct will not 
be covered.  Under the objective and hybrid perspectives, policyholder 
behavior will be over-deterred because coverage is dependent not on the 
policyholder’s subjective and controllable intent, but on an objective, third 
party view of what conduct is reasonable.  When that view differs from the 
policyholder’s (which it does in nearly all of these cases, or a policyholder 
probably would not have behaved a certain way), a policyholder lacks 
predictable coverage information to assist in determining how to behave so 
as to remain within liability coverage protection.  Furthermore, litigants in 
insurance coverage disputes will differ as to what types of conduct appear 
“reasonable” or not.  This fuels the litigation. 
Finally, some courts use a subjective interpretive perspective to 
hold that coverage is not ousted unless the policyholder actually expected 
or intended the loss.24 This perspective offers the most predictable 
                                                                                                                          
22 ROBERT H. JERRY & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 
LAW 460 (4th ed. 2007). 
23 See, e.g., Canterberry v. Chamblee, 41, 940, p. 6 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/27/07); 
953 So. 2d 900, 904 (finding no coverage where boy intended to fight even though 
he did not intend to break victim’s nose); Hatmaker v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
308 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (finding no coverage where 
policyholder threw victim to ground and punched him in head, even though 
policyholder did not intend to cause any injuries); Harleysville Ins. Cos. v. Garitta, 
785 A.2d 913, 923 (N.J. 2001) (finding no coverage where the policyholder 
stabbed victim twice and pled guilty to third-degree murder even though 
policyholder had not intended to cause death). 
24 See, e.g., Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Kenway Contracting, Inc., 240 S.W.3d 
633, 640 (Ky. 2007) (finding coverage where policyholder conducted a demolition 
and tore down entire residential structure instead of the intended carport because 
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approach to the intentional act fortuity clause because it is the only 
approach that removes coverage when a policyholder’s behavior results in 
a non-fortuitous loss.  A policyholder knows where she stands vis-à-vis 
coverage: if she intends the loss, coverage will not attach. 
To complicate matters further, courts split further as to what must 
be intended by the policyholder: the intentional action alone25 or both the 
intentional action and the resultant injury.26 For example, even though a 
child may have intended to light a fire as a prank, if no damage was 
intended, liability for the resulting fire loss would be covered under the 
latter approach.27 The problem with determining coverage based on the 
policyholder’s actions is that most actions have some intentional 
component to them.  These cases, therefore, tend to hyper-examine the 
conduct leading up to a loss to determine what intentional actions 
comprised the behavior.  Proving intent is also fraught with difficulty 
because coverage often turns on circumstantial evidence or the credibility 
of the policyholder’s testimony.  This makes determining which of the 
                                                                                                                          
he did not subjectively intend damage to the entire residential structure); Clayburn 
v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 871 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488–89 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009) (finding that a policyholder who put victim in bear hug and fell through 
plate glass window was still covered because injuries were not subjectively 
intended); Allstate Ins. Co. v Sanders, 495 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (D. Nev. 2007) 
(finding that intentional act fortuity clause did not bar coverage despite 
policyholder throwing a metal sign at someone during horseplay because 
policyholder did not subjectively intend to hit or injure victim). 
25 See, e.g., Fontenot v. Duplechine, 2004-424, pp. 6–7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
12/8/04); 891 So. 2d 41, 46–47 (finding no coverage when student struck 
classmate on the head with desktop, regardless of student’s intent to injure); Metro. 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Buckner, 302 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) 
(finding no coverage where teens fired rifles at tractor-trailers on interstate, killing 
and injuring people, even though their intent was to damage trucks; their intent to 
discharge rifles was not enough to oust coverage). 
26 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Weaver, 585 F. Supp. 2d 722, 729 
(D.S.C. 2008) (explaining that both the act that caused the loss and the results 
thereof must be intentional); Lincoln Logan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fornshell, 722 N.E.2d 
239, 242–43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (explaining that both the act and the harm must be 
intended). 
27 See, e.g., Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417, 421 (S.C. 
1994) (finding coverage where a teen, acting in self-defense, struck another teen 
but did not intend to cause extensive eye injuries); Miller v. Fidelity-Phoenix Ins. 
Co., 231 S.E.2d 701, 75 (S.C. 1977) (coverage for ten-year-old boy who set fire to 
fire trucks was granted because he did not intend for the fire to burn down a home). 
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policyholder’s actions trigger a fortuity clause a question with an answer 
that is somewhat of a moving target. 
 
b.   Criminal Act Fortuity Clause 
 
Courts attempting to apply the criminal act fortuity clause to make 
coverage determinations have devised two different ways of interpreting 
this clause, with correspondingly different coverage results.  Some courts 
have held that any policyholder’s criminal act causally related to the loss 
ousts liability insurance coverage, regardless of the policyholder’s intent to 
cause the loss.28 Still others have held that a policyholder committing a 
crime at the time of the loss will lose liability coverage, regardless as to 
whether the crime itself is causally involved in bringing about the loss29 or 
whether there was even a criminal charge or conviction.30 Other courts 
have held that, in order to oust coverage, a policyholder must have intended 
the loss brought about by the criminal act.31 This subjective approach best 
matches the criminal act fortuity clause’s purpose as a clause targeted at 
removing coverage for non-fortuitous behavior.  Otherwise, the clause risks 
being used as an unpredictable morality clause, as described more fully 
below. 
 
                                                                                                                          
28 See, e.g., Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 608 F.3d 388, 391–92 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (explaining that the criminal act fortuity clause does not require 
subjective intent to commit the crime); SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 
N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that no subjective intent is 
required to trigger criminal act fortuity clause where mentally ill boy stabbed his 
neighbor with a knife). 
29 See, e.g., Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. K.S., 731 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (S.D. 
Ind. 2010) (denying coverage where a boy “mooned” an oncoming vehicle, 
distracting the driver and causing her to flip the car, as “mooning” is considered a 
crime). 
30 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Berube, 854 A.2d 53, 56 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) 
(explaining that a policyholder who got into bed with a rifle and accidentally shot 
his wife could theoretically be charged with a crime because he risked injury of 
shooting the child who was also in bed with him). 
31 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Raynor, 21 P.3d 707, 712 (Wash. 2001) 
(explaining that the criminal act fortuity clause does not apply to all acts 
technically classified as crimes but only to serious criminal conduct done with 
malicious intent). 
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c.   Insurance Policy Interpretation Differences 
 
State-by-state and even court-by-court differences in the basic 
insurance policy doctrinal tools employed to interpret fortuity clauses result 
in additional inconsistency in interpreting even identically-worded fortuity 
clauses.  As insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, special 
policyholder-friendly rules have developed over time to assist in fairly 
applying meaning to insurance policy language.32 Many states employ a 
varied panoply of interpretive tools to help discern the meaning of 
insurance policy language.  Some states utilize the reasonable expectations 
doctrine to varying degrees.33 That doctrine holds that the reasonable 
expectations of the policyholder have some interpretive value in discerning 
the meaning of insurance policy language.  Other states are far stricter 
constructionists of insurance policy language, and reasonable expectations 
do not come into play in their analyses.  Some states also more regularly 
employ the doctrine of contra proferentem to construe ambiguous wording 
against the insurer drafter. 
In some instances, state statutes34 or state public policy35 hold that 
liability insurance policies do not cover losses arising from a policyholders’ 
                                                                                                                          
32 For a discussion of how special policyholder-friendly rules have developed 
over time, see, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy 
Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531 (1996); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra 
Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 
(2006); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules 
of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992); Robert E. 
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 961 (1970); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance 
Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 
543 (1996); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting 
Off the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1991).  
33 See generally, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-
Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1151 (1981); Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the 
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 295 (1998); Swisher, 
Judicial Interpretations, supra note 32; Swisher, Judicial Rationales, supra note 
32.  
34 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 2013) (“An insurer is not liable for a 
loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the 
negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents or others”). 
35 See, e.g., Swan Consultants, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., 360 F. Supp. 
2d 582, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that New York public policy prohibits 
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own willful acts, even if there is no express fortuity clause in the policy 
itself.  When courts construe fortuity clauses, these additional principles 
can confusingly overlap with the insurance policy interpretation exercise. 
These differences in interpretive approaches have a costly litigation 
spillover effect because litigants often cannot predict how their own courts 
would interpret a clause.  Indeed, while some courts take a literalist view 
about the applicability of the intentional and criminal act fortuity clauses, 
others are far more contextual and hold that these clauses may mean 
different things depending on the context and policyholder behavior being 
examined. 
 
2.  Litigation Distortions 
 
There are obvious consistency problems with courts using three 
interpretive perspectives and two substantive requirements to interpret the 
intentional act fortuity clause and, at the same time, using four interpretive 
perspectives to interpret the criminal act fortuity clause.  These problems 
are compounded by the workarounds invented by litigation counsel 
intended to circumvent some of the challenges with these fortuity clauses. 
The litigation workarounds produce further costly and unpredictable 
litigation distortions. 
First, the practice of over or under-pleading a policyholder’s 
conduct to attract or repel coverage at the pleadings stage of an action 
                                                                                                                          
insurance indemnification for intentionally-caused injuries); Capitol Indem. Corp. 
v. Evolution, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1075 (D.N.D. 2003) (explaining that all 
insurance policy provisions that allow coverage for intentionally caused injuries 
are void by public policy); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Montagna, 874 A.2d 
406, 408–09 (Me. 2005) (explaining that policies will not be interpreted to require 
an insurer to defend or indemnify an insured for the insured’s own criminal acts); 
Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scruggs, 886 So.2d 714, 720 (Miss. 2004); Merrimack 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Coppola, 690 A.2d 1059, 1065 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1997) (explaining that the reasonable insurance contract between the parties 
excludes all intentional acts); Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115, 
1120 (Ohio 1996); Minn. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854, 866 (Pa. 
2004) (explaining that public policy supports providing coverage for acts that were 
not intentional); American Family Mut. Ins. Grp. v. Kostaneski, 688 N.W.2d 410, 
415 (S.D. 2004) (explaining that South Dakota public policy precludes extending 
coverage to an individual who intentionally harms others.); Decorative Ctr. of 
Houston v. Emp’rs Cas. Co., 833 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) 
(explaining that an insured cannot insure against his own intentional misconduct).  
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actually twists the litigation story in inefficient ways.36 Policyholders are 
incentivized to under-plead their case as one involving negligent, not 
intentional or criminal, conduct in order to ensure that there will be liability 
insurance coverage for the loss.  At the same time, insurers are incentivized 
to over-plead that the policyholder’s behavior is particularly intentional or 
criminal, and anti-social and dangerous, in an attempt to avoid covering a 
particular loss.  In doing so, litigation counsel may strain and stretch the 
facts to a near-unsupportable point in order to craft the litigation story away 
from or towards intentional or criminal conduct.  This leads to 
inefficiencies in the fact-finding discovery process as parties spend 
expensive time attempting to mold the nature of the policyholder’s conduct 
not because they actually want the truth but because they want it to either 
be, or not be, a certain category of behavior important only for insurance 
coverage purposes.  
Second, creative lawyers for injured accident victims have 
attempted to get around the operation of a fortuity clause by focusing 
instead on viable alternative litigation targets through doctrinal innovations 
such as vicarious liability or claims for negligent supervision.37 If a 
policyholder’s intentional or criminal behavior may trigger a fortuity clause 
and thereby leave an accident victim without compensation, the victim’s 
lawyer could instead target another category of policyholder who may have 
some secondary responsibility for the victim’s injury and who may be 
covered by liability insurance.  A common example is the use of vicarious 
liability to access insurance coverage from another policyholder’s liability 
policy.  Often, these are institutional policyholders with supervisory 
responsibilities over the policyholder who more directly caused the victim 
harm.  For example, a victim of a sexual assault would typically sue the 
perpetrator but, to seek liability insurance coverage, may also sue the 
perpetrator’s employer in negligence for failing to supervise the 
                                                                                                                          
36 Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT 
LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 66, 69 (David M. Engel & Michael 
McCann eds., 2009); Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harms and 
the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (1997); Rick 
Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 742–44 (2012); 
Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 123–29 
(2001). 
37 Swedloff, supra note 36, at 742; Wriggins, supra note 36, at 164. 
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employee.38 Also, parents and supervisory adults can be sued for 
negligently supervising children in their care when children injure others 
through intentional or criminal conduct.  When third parties like 
supervisory or vicariously liable institutions or parents are injected into the 
litigation fray for coverage-seeking purposes only, this can often add 
unnecessary delay, complication, and expense to a lawsuit.  However, 
accident victims are often forced to bring in these additional parties to 
ensure access to at least some compensation through liability insurance. 
Third, fortuity clauses affect settlement dynamics in significant 
ways. In order to preserve insurance coverage, both policyholders and 
accident victims have greater incentives to settle a case rather than litigate.  
For example, an accident victim may be involved in litigation exhibiting 
multiple causes of action.  Such a victim may be incentivized to avoid a 
judgment on the merits regarding any policyholder intentional or criminal 
conduct that might thereby trigger a fortuity clause and thus exclude 
liability insurance coverage.  A policyholder is incentivized to settle to 
preserve personal assets (although the control of the litigation is often 
through the insurer’s appointed counsel, the policyholder is obliged to co-
operate in the litigation).  The policyholder would want to neither admit nor 
deny liability regarding an intentional or criminal act in order to maintain 
coverage. 
Finally, fortuity clause interpretation can fall into common 
doctrinal pitfalls about insurance causation, creating further 
unpredictability as courts and litigants take different interpretive positions 
about the same fortuity clauses.  To trigger a fortuity clause, the 
policyholder’s behavior should be causative of the loss.  The “expected or 
intended” intentional act fortuity clause specifically assumes this in its 
wording.  Other intentional act fortuity clauses oust coverage for loss or 
damage “resulting from,” “arising out of,” or “caused by” an intentional act 
of the policyholder.  Criminal act fortuity clauses also use that similar 
linguistic construction where coverage is ousted if the loss or damage is 
“resulting from,” “arising out of,” or “caused by” a criminal act of the 
policyholder. 
If the loss is caused by some other behavior but the policyholder’s 
intentional or criminal actions occurs somewhere in the factual matrix, 
coverage should not be removed.  Insurance causation issues in liability 
                                                                                                                          
38 See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Klenk, Emerging Coverage Issues in Employment 
Practices Liability Insurance: The Industry Perspective on Recent Developments, 
21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 323–27 (1999). 
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insurance can get misleadingly confused with tort principles of causation.39 
This can prompt courts to produce inconsistent coverage decisions about 
fortuity clauses.  The question should not be “the policyholder acted 
intentionally or criminally and the loss occurred.”  The question should 
instead be “was the policyholder’s intentional or criminal action one that 
brought about the loss.”  However, it is very tempting for courts and 
litigants to wade into concepts of causal fault and blameworthiness, 
particularly because the conduct being considered is intentional or criminal 
and courts are used to sorting those questions using fault-based and crime-
based language.  Insurer litigants may be incentivized to bend insurance 
causation principles with criminal and fault-based causation concepts to get 
a coverage denial.  This merely detracts from the very specific insurance 
policy interpretation issue about whether the fortuity clause applies or not, 
given the role of certain behavior in bringing about a certain loss. 
Differing interpretive approaches and litigation distortions are the 
two major sources of unpredictability leading to the problematic nature of 
these fortuity clauses.  While the interpretive unpredictability is inherent in 
the design and wording of the clause itself and the applicable legal rules 
around interpreting policy language, the litigation distortions have 
expanded in nature over time.  Greater certainty in dealing with fortuity 
clauses would go a long way to saving money for insurers setting insurance 
premiums and funding coverage litigation.  It would also save 
policyholders money as there would be less coverage litigation about the 
ambiguous nature of fortuity clauses.  The by-product of this is that 
accident victims’ compensatory needs hang in the balance.  They may have 
to wait until the coverage questions are sorted out.  They may also, often 
unpredictably, lose out on compensation one might expect would be a 
sensible commercial result if a particular loss triggers a particular liability 
insurance policy.  
 
B. THE COMPENSATORY GAP 
 
Victims of intentional act torts and crimes, or “fortuity victims,” 
are often seriously injured and have dire compensatory needs.40 These are 
the victims of assaults, attempted murders, and sexual assaults.  The 
compensatory gap left by the varying and unpredictable approaches to 
                                                                                                                          
39 Knutsen, supra note 4, at 968–70. 
40 Swedloff, supra note 36, at 739, 741–44 (detailing the compelling need for 
compensation for this particular subset of accident victims). 
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fortuity clauses expands and contracts because of the unpredictability 
involved in interpreting the clauses.  Streamline the interpretive process 
and one could better control which types of victims would be facing a 
compensatory gap, all with an eye to designing a system to sensibly address 
such gaps.41 As a result, much fortuity clause insurance coverage litigation 
would also drop away.  Many fortuity victims find themselves in that 
compensation gap because they were unlucky enough to be injured by a 
policyholder whose coverage was later denied by an insurer or court 
interpreting a fortuity clause in one way or another.  The problem is that 
other victims in similar circumstances may not meet the same fate, 
depending on a given insurer or court’s approach to interpreting the fortuity 
clause at issue.  This is a very costly and profound problem because it is 
difficult to recognize and define solutions for a constantly fluctuating group 
of people with real compensatory needs in society.  It is also difficult for 
insurers trying to set risk-based premiums for risk pools when the potential 
payout mutates.  It is difficult for policyholders trying to evaluate liability 
insurance coverage purchases.  A good start to addressing these problems 
caused by this mutating compensatory gap is to ensure that fortuity clauses 
are interpreted in predictable fashions so that one can discern who is in the 
gap and how big it really is. 
If liability insurance proceeds are denied fortuity victims as a result 
of the operation of a fortuity clause, where do those injury costs go?  There 
are few other avenues of recourse left.  The policyholder is likely unable to 
provide compensatory assistance in a personal fashion.42 Very few people 
carry first party disability insurance.43 Most may carry health insurance for 
the out-of-pocket expenses from physical injuries.  There may be recourse 
for the fortuity victim through government-run victims’ compensation 
funds, but these are often limited in nature.44 Most fortuity victims, 
                                                                                                                          
41 Swedloff, supra note 36, at 724–27 (generating solutions for serious gaps in 
intentional tort victims’ ability to recover damages in the face of fortuity clauses); 
Wriggins, supra note 36, at 152–57 (exploring solutions for victims of domestic 
violence torts who are presently not compensated because of the operation of 
fortuity clauses in their attackers’ liability insurance policies). 
42  Stephen Giles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 
606 (2006) (detailing how most tortfeasors in lawsuits would be unable to satisfy a 
tort judgment from their personal assets). 
43 See, e.g., Jerry & Richmond, supra note 22, at 482–83.  
44 Swedloff, supra note 36, at 726 (noting the limited nature of government-
run criminal injuries compensation schemes). 
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however, are left to “lump it.”45 That means that the social cost of 
absorbing their injury-related expenses is off-loaded from the at-fault 
tortfeasor to employer workplace accommodations and to primarily state-
funded programs for the needy: Medicare, Medicaid, welfare, and other 
state disability programs.46 The fact remains that the current web of modern 
accident compensation relies heavily on privately available liability 
insurance.  There are just not sufficient mechanisms to provide effective 
compensation for fortuity victims who unpredictably fall through the cracks 
solely because they cannot access a policyholder’s liability insurance due 
to some conduct on the part of the policyholder, which itself is fortuitous 
when viewed from some interpretive perspectives.  So, having a smaller 
and more predictably identifiable group of uncompensated fortuity victims 
would take the burden off of the other, inadequate socialized compensation 
mechanisms.  This would shift some of the burden to insurers who may 
have taken a premium for underwriting a risk that will never materialize 
simply because of a fluxious interpretation of a fortuity clause in the wake 
of actual fortuitous behavior on the part of the policyholder.  What it would 
leave would be those whose losses are the result of truly non-fortuitous 
circumstances, which best suits the true purpose of liability insurance in the 
first place. 
 
VI. THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEMS 
 
The reason that there are palpable and systemic inconsistencies 
with how these fortuity clauses are applied in a liability insurance context 
stems from two linked, dynamic notions: the tensions between the two 
purposes of liability insurance (wealth protection and victim compensation) 
coupled with a move from explanatory rhetoric about fortuity to 
explanatory rhetoric about morality.  
 
                                                                                                                          
45 See, e.g., Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and 
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 547 (1981) 
(describing the strategy of not pursuing a claim and writing it off to “experience”). 
46 Pryor, supra note 19, at 309–10 (demonstrating how the cost of tort law’s 
occasional failure to compensate accident victims is borne elsewhere in society, in 
an inefficient manner). 
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A. THE TENSION BETWEEN WEALTH PROTECTION AND ACCIDENT  
COMPENSATION 
 
The tension between two perceived purposes for liability insurance 
is at the root of the uncertainty in interpreting fortuity clauses.  Solving this 
tension – or at least recognizing it and balancing it appropriately in context 
– would go a long way toward streamlining the interpretive process, 
keeping litigation costs down, and reducing the mutating compensation 
gap. 
Liability insurance is different than other types of insurance in that 
it is third party insurance.  That difference is at the heart of the tension 
between the two purposes for this kind of insurance.  Unlike property, life, 
and long-term disability insurance (all of which are first party insurance 
products), the proceeds of any triggered liability insurance go to pay some 
injured third party for a loss resulting from the policyholder’s behavior.  
Private market liability insurance comprises the largest and most prevalent 
compensatory source for injured accident victims.47 Liability insurance is 
the backbone of the tort system.  Tort suits would not be brought if not for 
available liability insurance.48 Society has organized itself around there 
being a private insurance safety blanket for much of today’s risky conduct, 
from driving to owning a business or a home.49 So liability insurance serves 
an important and expected societal accident compensation goal. 
However, these are not the reasons why liability insurance is 
designed and marketed by insurers, or purchased by policyholders.  
Liability insurance is bought and sold as a risk transfer product to protect 
the assets of a policyholder in the event that policyholder becomes legally 
liable to pay for another’s loss.  This wealth protection purpose is very 
different from the broader compensatory purpose that liability insurance 
serves in society.  Insurance as wealth protection focuses on the concerns 
of the policyholder who purchased the insurance product.  Insurance as 
                                                                                                                          
47 See Baker, supra note 5, at 4–6 (arguing that liability insurance has become 
“a de facto element of tort liability”). 
48  Id. at 4; Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of 
Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 275 (2001) (detailing how tort 
suits are typically not brought unless there are valid, collectible insurance proceeds 
available); Adam F. Scales, Following Form: Corporate Succession and Liability 
Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 573, 614 (2011) (noting that tort and insurance 
exist in “complementarity”). 
49 Wriggins, supra note 36, at 150 (noting the prevalence of insurance in 
society). 
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accident compensation focuses on the concerns of the injured accident 
victim in society (or, more broadly, on the concerns of society for 
compensating accident victims).  One can be fairly certain that most 
policyholders do not purchase liability insurance out of altruistic concern 
for the well-being of some future accident victim who is a complete 
stranger.  At most, that effect is a secondary offshoot of the insurance 
purchase.  Yet, of course, most policyholders would wish and expect that 
anyone or any entity who injures them would carry sufficient liability 
insurance so that appropriate compensation would be forthcoming to that 
policyholder victim.  The accident compensation purpose of liability 
insurance thus raises an interesting collective action concern.  The accident 
compensation purpose is the reason why injured accident victims hope 
others have purchased liability insurance yet the wealth protection purpose 
is the reason why the policyholder actually purchases the insurance.  The 
focus changes from victim to policyholder as one examines these two 
purposes of liability insurance.  
Liability insurance is therefore a very strange market product: it is 
something we think we buy to help us protect our wealth but it additionally 
helps someone else as well.  This is all the more strange when one adds the 
fact that most policyholders would not be able to pay for a tort judgment 
out of their own personal assets in any event.50 The result of a tort suit 
against most uninsured people would be either no tort suit at all or 
bankruptcy.  So there is, quite literally, often little to no wealth to protect.  
Yet, at the same time, those with modest assets to protect may actually 
value the wealth protection aspect of insurance even more than a wealthy 
policyholder, simply because the loss of their modest assets would mean 
financial destitution.  Policyholders’ subjective value of the wealth 
protection aspect of insurance therefore is mediated by the value placed on 
that policyholder’s wealth. 
However, this tension between the two purposes of liability 
insurance informs much of the interpretive process when courts are faced 
with having to interpret fortuity clauses.  In that context, can these two 
purposes of liability insurance co-exist, or are they mutually exclusive?  As 
will be shown, both purposes need to be balanced against each other, but in 
the liability insurance context, the actual effect of the wealth protection 
purpose on those with modest assets to protect can be less significant in 
most instances whereas the effect of the accident compensation purpose on 
a severely injured victim is certainly tangible, but is left to hang in the 
                                                                                                                          
50 See, e.g., Giles, supra note 42, at 606; Baker, supra note 5, at 7. 
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balance.  Surprisingly, this is often forgotten in the shift from fortuity to 
morality clause as will next be described.  The wealth protection purpose 
controls the rhetoric at the expense of the accident victim’s – and 
ultimately society’s – compensatory needs. 
 
B.   FROM FORTUITY CLAUSE TO MORALITY CLAUSE 
 
Having dynamic tension between the two purposes of liability 
insurance creates opportunities for using different explanatory rhetoric 
about what fortuity clauses are supposed to be doing.  This creates much of 
the unprincipled inefficiencies and unfairness as noted above in the 
previous Part.  Quite simply, courts can get mired in misleading rhetoric.  
Litigants in an insurance dispute (especially insurers) are incentivized to 
use this competing rhetoric to their advantage.  The rhetoric goes 
something like this: do fortuity clauses ensure that insurers only indemnify 
for fortuitous losses?  Or instead do fortuity clauses provide a mechanism 
for punishment and deterrence by ensuring that wrongdoing policyholders 
are deprived of the wealth protection benefit of liability insurance?  The 
answer depends on how one views what liability insurance is supposed to 
be doing: protecting a policyholder’s wealth or acting as a source of 
compensation for an injured accident victim. 
 
1.   The Move from Morality to Fortuity 
 
To explain how a fortuity clause can be rhetorically mutated into a 
“morality” clause,51 one needs to understand the origins of the choice of 
language for fortuity clauses in liability insurance.  Historically, insurance 
has had a societal challenge: it has had to separate itself from gambling, 
once seen as an immoral act.52 It is not difficult to understand, even with 
today’s sensibilities, that profiting by guessing on whether or not some 
terrible disaster will befall a policyholder can be an activity tinged with 
moral undertones.  One only has to think about life insurance, a product 
that essentially hedges a bet on when the policyholder will die, to see the 
moral implications and concerns – all the more so if a policyholder or some 
wrongdoer attempts to tip the scales of chance by controlling the risk of an 
outcome actually occurring. 
                                                                                                                          
51 Knutsen, supra note 8, at 103–11 (fortuity clauses shift to morality clauses).  
52 Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 244-
49 (1996) (describing the genesis of the insurance concept of moral hazard). 
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The term “moral hazard” as understood today in insurance law is 
used to describe the situation whereby the presence of insurance reduces 
incentives to minimize losses because the losses will be insured.53 But 
originally, in the nineteenth century, “moral hazard” was about a financial 
concern to insurers that was simultaneously a full-fledged moral concern to 
a society not used to the concept of insurance.  The “moral” hazard was 
about altering the odds of the insurance arrangement so as to make a 
chance loss a certain loss.54 Purchasing fire property insurance and then 
burning down one’s own house to get the insurance proceeds is the classic 
example.  
At the time, the insurance market consisted largely of maritime, 
fire and property insurance, not liability insurance.55 Insurance was bought 
and sold purely as a wealth protection product.  There was no need to 
consider victim compensation because there was no market for liability 
insurance.  There did not yet exist the societal web of compensatory 
structures designed to address accident victims’ needs.  Insurance was not 
expected to provide injury compensation. 
Specific to concerns about insurance and morality was the 
longstanding legal notion that a criminal should not be able to profit from 
his crime.56 This “public policy” rule holds, for example, that a murderer 
should not be able to obtain the proceeds of life insurance from the 
policyholder he murdered if he was also the beneficiary of the policy.  
Behavior such as willful arson to one’s own home to cash in on insurance 
proceeds would be deemed “immoral” by society, illegal by the courts, as 
well as unprofitable to insurers.  Policyholders tinkering with those odds 
were a particularly “moral” hazard for (mostly fire) insurers of the 
nineteenth century because those insurers were struggling with a public 
relations image problem set squarely in morality concerns.  By removing 
the “moral” hazards from insurance, insurers could create a more profitable 
enterprise and, at the same time, a more socially palatable form of 
institutional risk transfer.  
                                                                                                                          
53 Id. at 242. 
54 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT 
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008) (detailing the rise of liability 
insurance in the marketplace and its role in society). 
55 Baker, supra note 52, at 240. 
56 See generally, e.g., Mary Coate McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability 
Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 26 (1941) (explaining how illegality is a mediating 
concept in early insurance law). 
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To an insurer concerned about insuring only risky, not certain, 
losses, it was important to remove coverage for losses intentionally and 
thus certainly brought about by a policyholder’s conduct.  This, in turn, 
would solve not only the very practical commercial efficacy concerns of 
the insurer, but also the concerns about insurance violating the public 
policy rule and the concerns about insurance incentivizing loss-causing 
behavior.  In law, there are two categories of behavior that involve 
policyholders’ intentional conduct: intentional torts and criminal behavior.  
To remove the incentive for policyholders to bring about certain losses, any 
insurance policy would therefore have to target that kind of intentional or 
criminal behavior, which would either violate the public policy rule or 
result in policyholders obtaining coverage for losses they intentionally 
caused.  The intentional act fortuity clause was written to remove insurance 
coverage for intentional torts.  A criminal acts fortuity clause would ensure 
that certain losses arising from criminal conduct would also be removed 
from coverage.  
Excluding from insurance coverage losses arising from a 
policyholder’s criminal conduct had a three-fold effect.  First, criminal law 
by nature typically assumes an element of intent or mens rea: one has to 
intend to do the crime in order to be convicted.57 At the time of the clause’s 
genesis, the criminal law was far less complex and nuanced than it is today, 
with fewer regulatory offences or fluctuating states of intent that could be 
considered criminal.  This original batch of largely specific intent-based 
crimes served up a ready-made category of intentional conduct which is 
precisely the type of conduct targeted by the very moral hazard concerns of 
insurers of the day.  Second, the clause contractually enshrined the public 
policy rule that criminals could not profit from their crimes through 
insurance proceeds.  Finally, removing from coverage losses brought about 
by criminal behavior served the additional purpose of again separating the 
insurance business from the moral concerns about policyholders seeking to 
profit from their crimes.  The criminal act fortuity clause appeared to target 
wrongful behavior that people naturally do not like.  If crime made up a 
category of behavior which society did not condone, and if crime happened 
to be the same type of behavior that was also non-fortuitous and thus 
uninsurable, this appeared to be the perfect exclusion.  The clause thus 
deters criminals and those intent on causing harm from using insurance to 
reap ill-gotten gains.  It also punishes those same bad actors because their 
                                                                                                                          
57 For those crimes that have a specific intent element like murder, assault, and 
arson. 
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insurance coverage –t he very benefit for which they paid – is removed 
based on their conduct.  To the insurance-shy audience of the time, this 
second message undoubtedly played better than the first.  They could rest 
assured that insurance was not incentivizing crime. 
The intentional act and criminal act fortuity clauses then found 
their way into a burgeoning liability insurance market many years later.  
The early years of the liability insurance market existed without the societal 
expectation that liability insurance would be the backbone of the accident 
compensation system.58 People whose injuries were not compensated by 
liability insurance proceeds were largely expected to “lump it.”  Liability 
insurance was marketed and constructed much as property insurance: as a 
wealth protection mechanism for a policyholder concerned about having to 
pay for potential legal liability (and, as a byproduct, was a source of 
compensation for the accident victim).  Because liability insurance 
provides coverage for a policyholder’s legal liability, it stands to reason 
that, if the legal liability was brought about by a loss a policyholder 
intentionally caused, the policyholder’s conduct resulting in the intentional 
loss is a moral hazard and should be excluded from coverage.  The 
intentional act fortuity clause therefore performs that same moral hazard 
gatekeeping function it would in a property policy.  The same could be said 
for the effect of the criminal act fortuity clause in liability insurance 
policies except it additionally maintained the function of underscoring that 
criminals could not enjoy wealth protection from legal liability arising from 
crimes they committed.  The crimes targeted were those specific intent 
crimes of the day like murder and arson.  Criminal law was, as has been 
mentioned, far simpler than the laundry list of crimes comprising most 
penal codes today. 
Another way to separate the insurance business from the moral 
undertones of gambling on the happenstance (or not) of another’s disaster, 
and the fear that some would consciously influence events in order to bring 
about an insured loss, was to shift the language of discourse about 
insurance from morality to fortuity.  Concepts of risk can then be discussed 
in essentially amoral terms.  At some point in time, the insurance industry 
shifted its public identity from being a business concerned about separating 
itself from immoral gambling to being a business offering wealth 
protection through risk exchange.59 Perhaps this occurred over time as 
insurance proliferated and people became used to seeing insurance operate 
                                                                                                                          
58  ABRAHAM, supra note 54. 
59 Baker, supra note 52, at 258–59. 
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without many nefarious moral hazard concerns being realized.  Perhaps 
instead it was a concerted industry effort to further separate insurance from 
morality and thus sanitize the business of insurance as it entered into 
regular commerce.  Regardless, insurance became less about moral public 
image and more about risk and fortuity.  Liability insurance proliferated 
and became the backbone of the accident compensation system.  The 
criminal law became far more complex beyond mere specific intent crimes.  
The concept of moral hazard shed its “moral” roots and became aimed 
instead at an insurer’s concern for incentivizing overly risky behavior due 
to the presence of available insurance.  Yet, the intentional act and criminal 
act fortuity clauses originally aimed at not only insurer profitability and 
fortuity concerns, but morality concerns as well, remained in liability 
insurance policies.  The attempt to get morality out of insurance was 
largely successful, except for the potential throwback effect of these 
fortuity clauses. 
However, a partially successful fortuity story could be told using 
these clauses, giving them the appearance that they still operated as 
intended in the new world of fortuity.  It is true that intentionally caused 
losses are borne of the very fortuity-frustrating behavior that wreaks havoc 
with the insurance arrangement.  But unless what is excluded from 
coverage is actually only behavior that turns a fortuitous event into a 
certain event, the fortuity clause is doing something else.  Herein lies the 
problem, and the source of the inconsistency in the court decisions 
construing fortuity clauses in insurance coverage disputes.  The only 
behavior in a liability insurance context that takes a fortuitous event and 
makes it a certain event is that behavior in which the policyholder engages 
with the specific and subjective intent to bring about the realized loss.  If 
the policyholder did not intend the specific type of loss, the loss is still 
fortuitous to the policyholder.  Therefore, removing liability insurance 
coverage for behavior that results in an unintended loss does not influence 
the policyholder’s behavior and is done at the expense of the accident 
victim awaiting compensation.  The moral hazard problem, in fortuity 
terms, is not affected. 
 
2.   The Move from Fortuity Back to Morality 
 
However, the moral trappings of the intentional act and criminal 
act fortuity clauses remain.  In fact, liability insurers are incentivized to 
hearken back to the moral bases of these clauses because they are 
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compelling (if misleading) platforms for arguing for policyholders’ 
coverage denial.60 In this regard, the fortuity clauses can frequently 
transform into morality clauses in an insurance coverage dispute.61 The 
conversation shifts from one about fortuity and risk transfer concepts to one 
about morality involving how denying insurance coverage produces 
desirable social effects of punishment and deterrence.  At the same time, 
and via the same dynamic, the notion of liability insurance as accident 
victim compensation source is eclipsed by a return to an exclusive notion 
of liability insurance as wealth protection for the policyholder.  These two 
planes of discourse converge to warp judicial analysis about insurance 
coverage and produce inconsistent and troubling results because no 
purposes of insurance are actually fulfilled in the end result: not victim 
compensation or wealth protection nor fortuity or punishment concerns.  
The rhetoric just does not work. 
For example, a policyholder is showing to his friend a firearm he 
believes is unloaded.  The policyholder slips and the gun accidentally 
discharges and injures the friend.62 The policyholder did not intend to harm 
the victim but nonetheless is charged with criminal negligence causing 
bodily harm.  The criminal act fortuity clause ousts coverage for legal 
liability for a loss resulting from a “criminal act” of the policyholder.  On 
its face, this has been categorized as a criminal event – the policyholder 
was charged with a crime.  However, he did not intend to commit the 
crime.  He did not intend to harm the friend.  The main element of criminal 
negligence is the negligence standard – the marked departure from 
reasonable conduct in society.  There is no specific intent required to prove 
this crime.  It is a “negligence-based” crime targeting risky conduct. 
How, then, does an insurer argue that the legal liability resulting 
from this loss is excluded by the criminal act fortuity clause?  More 
                                                                                                                          
60 See, e.g., JAY FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE 
COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010) 
(canvassing the variety of tactics insurers are incentivized to undertake in denying 
claims); Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, 
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1410–11 
(1993) (exploring the way in which insurers weave the narrative in claims denials); 
Baker, supra note 36 (describing how moral considerations affect interpretation of 
the criminal act fortuity clause);. 
61 Knutsen, supra note 8, at 103. 
62 Similar to what occurred in the Ontario case of Eichmanis v. Wawanesa 
Mutual Insurance Co. (2007), 278 D.L.R. 4th 15 (Can. Ont. C.A.), except that the 
case involved thirteen- and fifteen-year-old boys. 
238   CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 21.1 
 
specifically, based on the wording of that clause, how can an insurer 
articulate the reasoning behind why a policyholder’s loss should not be 
covered?  This is an important point, because the result may be a denial of 
vital compensation to the injured friend.  An insurer could of course argue 
that the policyholder committed a criminal act and this policy ousts 
coverage for criminal acts, so there is no coverage, regardless as to the 
nature of the crime.  That is a literalist argument and it meets some success 
in some courts.63 However, again, the result is dire: the injured victim is left 
with nothing and the wealth protection aspect of insurance is not realized 
for the policyholder.  Many courts (though not all), operating in a pro-
coverage insurance law environment, are compelled to look further to 
satisfy themselves that this is indeed the result intended by this clause and 
this insurance policy.64 
A fortuity-based argument falls short.  The loss was fortuitous to 
the policyholder.  The policyholder did not intend for the firearm to 
discharge.  He did not intend the specific harm to his friend.  Indeed, he did 
not intend any harm to occur at all.  He thought the gun was unloaded.  So 
it is not possible to argue that the criminal act fortuity clause here is 
designed to circumvent fortuity-frustrating behavior by removing from 
coverage those losses that are certain.  The loss was fortuitous.  The 
policyholder could not have adjusted his gun-showing behavior to have ex 
ante avoided it.  Furthermore, liability insurance is broad-spectrum tort or 
behavior insurance, and perhaps this is just the sort of fortuitous behavior 
                                                                                                                          
63 See, e.g., Wilderman v. Powers, 956 A.2d 613 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) 
(denying coverage for liability for neighbor’s alleged psychological injuries when 
insured peeping tom photographed naked neighbor and was sued because his 
conduct was criminal in nature); Auto Club Grp. Ins. Co. v. Booth, 797 N.W.2d 
695 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (denying coverage for accidental shooting when drunk 
held gun against tenant’s wrist, even though he did not intend the gun to 
discharge); SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M, 755 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2008) (holding that youth’s attack of neighbor was a “criminal act,” 
regardless of intent of youth to harm neighbor); Gruninger v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 905 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (denying coverage when insured 
accidentally shot other hunter); Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 608 F.3d 
388 (8th Cir. 2010) (interpreting plain language of criminal act exclusion as having 
no intent requirement so insured’s intent irrelevant at time of accident). 
64 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 574 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1991) (discussing 
whether accidental shooting while cleaning gun was an accident that could 
“reasonably be expected to result” from a “criminal act,” despite insured’s guilty 
plea to crime of recklessly causing death). 
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the policy is expected to cover.  So, under fortuity reasoning, this is the 
type of loss that liability insurance should cover – behavior courting some 
risk of loss. 
An insurer who then cannot make a compelling argument on 
fortuity grounds for ousting coverage via the criminal act fortuity clause 
often is then incentivized to return to the original moral basis for the clause.  
In doing so, insurers move from contract law principles to tort to criminal 
law, all in the context of an insurance policy interpretation issue that is 
typically and rightfully dealt with on contract-based insurance law 
principles alone.  Shifting legal spheres allows the insurer greater leeway to 
argue for the applicability of the fortuity clause while all the time moving 
up the moral ladder in persuasiveness.  Additionally, insurers shift the 
focus of discussion from the injured accident victim to the wrongdoer 
policyholder to those also in the insurance risk pool to society as a whole. 
Coverage should be denied the policyholder here, the moral 
argument goes, because we want to hold the wrongdoer accountable for his 
actions.  By denying the policyholder the wealth protection aspect of the 
insurance, the policyholder will have to pay for the loss himself, unaided 
by insurance.  This is a return to classic corrective justice reasoning from 
tort law involving redress between wrongdoer and victim,65 except the 
victim here appears to be the insurer and not the accident victim. As has 
been mentioned, there is little possibility that the policyholder ever benefits 
in today’s standard tort litigation settings because most do not have 
sufficient personal wealth to satisfy a tort judgment against them.66 
Furthermore, an insurer is also incentivized to argue that policyholders who 
behave in socially unacceptable ways are not deserving of liability 
insurance protection because this type of socially unacceptable conduct is 
not the sort that well-intentioned, premium-paying policyholders would 
want to support through payment out of their own risk pooled insurance 
funds.67 This shifts the focus again from the policyholder to the perceived 
desires of other allegedly upstanding policyholders in the risk pool.  Other 
policyholders would not want to subsidize a loss brought about by a 
                                                                                                                          
65 See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 926 (2010); Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort 
Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403, 410–13 (1989); see generally, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, 
RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 
(1995). 
66 Giles, supra note 42, at 606; Baker, supra note 48, at 291–92. 
67 Baker, supra note 36, at 75; Knutsen, supra note 8, at 105. 
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careless, gun-toting person who had the poor judgment to point the firearm 
at his friend.  The shift is a decidedly moral one, designed to appeal to a 
collective sense of moral conduct judgment on the part of a group not 
present in the lawsuit – other policyholders.  The sense is that reasonable 
policyholders would not behave like that, and therefore would not want 
their hard-earned premium dollars to go towards indemnifying for conduct 
they would deem unfit to insure.  Finally, insurers are incentivized to argue 
that coverage should be denied in these instances because we want to deter 
this kind of behavior from happening again.68 People should not point guns 
at other people.  The wrongdoer policyholder needs to be punished in order 
to achieve this deterrence goal, so the benefit of liability insurance should 
be denied to him.  These wrongdoer policyholders are, as Baker dubs them, 
the “moral monsters.”69  This shifts the argument to criminal law principles 
of punishment and deterrence.  The target of the argument is now not the 
accident victim, the policyholder or other policyholders but instead society 
as a whole.  The policyholder needs punishment so that this kind of bad act 
does not happen again.  The removal of wealth protection via insurance 
will accomplish that important societal goal.  But can it really? 
 
3.   Problems with the Moves 
 
There are many structural problems with this shift from fortuity 
clause to morality clause.  First, it produces incoherent and inconsistent 
judicial decisions because some courts rely on fortuity-based arguments to 
determine insurance coverage, while others are swayed by the moral 
arguments, and still others a little of both.  The reasoning patterns are 
different.  The underlying assumptions for the reasoning are different.  But 
the cause of much inconsistency is this very vacillation from fortuity to 
morality, from policyholder to insurer to society, and from the purpose of 
victim compensation to the purpose of wealth protection.  There are just too 
many exclusive structural axes to shift and combine in the analysis when 
the whole exercise is supposed to be about determining the presence or 
absence of liability insurance coverage based on principles of insurance 
policy interpretation. 
Second, the argument takes the moral origins of the fortuity clause 
and reverses them to apparently indicate that insurance can now do 
something that it actually is not designed to do at all.  At one time, the 
                                                                                                                          
68 Baker, supra note 36, at 77 (calling this the “moral monster” argument). 
69 Id.  
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insurance industry strove to separate its business from anything to do with 
morality.  That was the industry’s reason to shift to the discourse about 
fortuity and risk.  That was the reason why the fortuity clauses were 
inserted into the early policies.  Yet here, in the present, the insurance 
industry is incentivized to again return to morality but this time in a 
completely different way: insurer as morality crusader.  Instead of resiling 
from the idea that insurance is a potential mechanism for immorality to 
occur, the denial of insurance (now apparently a social good) is presented 
as a mechanism to provide socially desirable, moral benefits, like 
deterrence and punishment of criminals or bad actors. 
Insurance as presently constituted cannot achieve punishment and 
deterrence goals for a variety of reasons.  Most policyholders are unable to 
personally satisfy a tort judgment from their finances, so the ability to mete 
out punishment by denying liability insurance coverage would frequently 
be impossible.70 Even with a financially capable policyholder, the threat of 
losing liability insurance protection pales in comparison to the threats 
possible under civil or criminal law for the same conduct.71 For example, 
few criminals would say they were deterred from the crime due to fears of 
losing liability insurance coverage.  If fears of going to jail or of harming 
others do not deter the conduct, how can liability coverage concerns do the 
same?  Finally, few would condone insurers acting as quasi-public 
intermediaries for states in doling out some kind of social punishment.72 
                                                                                                                          
70 Giles, supra note 42, at 606. 
71 Malcolm Clarke, Insurance: The Proximate Cause in English Law, 40 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284, 302 (1981) (denying insurance coverage is an insignificant 
behavioral deterrent); Knutsen, supra note 8, at 109–10. 
72 See TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 505 (2003), in reference to a pre-publication form of 
Jonathan Simon’s book, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 
(2007). Baker and Logue note that there is an increasing gap between insured and 
uninsured conduct, which is the direct result of crime being defined as more than 
just intentional conduct. Not offering coverage for losses from criminal conduct 
sort of “deputizes” insurers “to serve as private law enforcement agencies 
empowered to mete out the ‘punishment’ of refusing insurance benefits without 
having to comply with the procedural requirements and protections that govern 
public law enforcement.” See id. at 198–200 (noting that “one-strike insurance 
exclusions,” like the criminal act fortuity clause, hit the middle class hardest as 
they rely on homeowners and commercial liability policies for a compensatory 
source; using crime as a category for insurability can result in a ghettoizing effect 
on policyholders by disproportionately affecting certain policyholders who are 
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Insurance law, based as it is largely on contract law principles, contains 
none of the standard liberty-protecting safeguards found in criminal law.  
Selling insurance policies to the public does not make insurers some sort of 
deputized private attorneys general who provide a contractually premised 
social vehicle through which anti-social behavior can be corrected.  Despite 
all of this, and most importantly, the fact remains that there is a competing 
expectation for the insurance proceeds beyond that of the policyholder.  
The accident victim’s compensation hangs in the balance of whatever 
moral considerations are weighed, making whatever punishment leveled on 
a policyholder felt, instead, by the victim herself, for it is the victim who is 
the ultimate recipient of the insurance indemnity. 
As the example about the policyholder’s accidental firearms 
discharge shows, insurers often cannot support both a fortuity-based and a 
morality-based argument at the same time because one explanation for 
coverage denial cancels out the other.  If the morality-based argument is 
misleading and inaccurate, as it most assuredly is, then that leaves the 
insurer with only fortuity-based arguments to buttress fortuity clause 
coverage denials.  And that is probably the way it should be.  The focus 
would remain on simple actuarial risk management principles and not on 
slippery moral concerns.  The focus would also remain on the 
policyholder’s conduct and whether or not the loss is certain or fortuitous, 
as opposed to some perceived social engineering wishes of an insurer, other 
policyholders in the risk pool, or society as a whole. 
But the shift from fortuity to morality also forces the conversation 
away from one about insurance as accident victim compensation source.  
There is no morality story to tell there about coverage denial.  In fact, the 
moral thing to do may well be to ensure that compensation is somehow 
available for the victim in some fashion or another, as long as the loss was 
realized fortuitously.  Turning a fortuity clause into a morality clause, 
however, prevents that consideration because the morality story is squarely 
focused on the purpose of insurance as a wealth protection mechanism for 
policyholders.  Keeping the analysis grounded in fortuity discourse is most 
compatible with an approach that at least does not lose sight of the fact that 
it is the accident victim’s compensation hanging in the balance. 
Is it possible to have an insurance story about the applicability of 
fortuity clauses where the discourse is grounded in neutral fortuity 
concerns, not morality concerns, and that still is compatible with both 
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notions of insurance as wealth protection and insurance as victim 
compensation source?  Perhaps.  The key would be to ensure that, 
whenever concerns about one purpose of liability insurance are driving the 
interpretive analysis, those concerns do not unsettlingly trump concerns of 
the other purpose.  The purposes do not have to compete but can be 
complementary.  This is only possible by avoiding morality discourse and 
keeping the insurance analysis grounded in fortuity discourse. 
For example, take the case about the policyholder negligently 
injuring his friend with the firearm.  Whether or not his liability insurance 
coverage should be ousted by his “criminal act” can be assessed using 
fortuity discourse.  His actions and the loss were entirely fortuitous.  What 
he did may have been careless, but it did not transform the shooting from 
possibility to certainty.  To that end, coverage should be maintained, 
despite his criminal charge.  Fortuity was not frustrated here.  This was still 
a chance loss.  This was, in other words, not a “criminal act” for insurance 
purposes resulting in a certain loss, even though the conduct may have 
triggered the criminal law for state sanction purposes.  By the same token, 
depriving the injured accident victim of his compensation also weighs 
against denying insurance coverage for anything but a non-fortuitous loss. 
So, if the same policyholder intentionally murdered his friend with 
the firearm, the situation would be different.  Here, his actions purposely 
changed the loss from a possibility to a certainty.  The policyholder had 
complete control as to whether or not that loss would be brought about.  He 
knew the gun was loaded.  Fortuity would be frustrated and the insurance 
arrangement breaks down.  This is the very risk that the fortuity clause 
targets.  It is the very thing insurance does not insure.  While the injured 
accident victim would lose his source of compensation, insurance based on 
fortuitous risk transfer is not the vehicle best tuned to provide that 
compensation.  One must look elsewhere at another compensatory solution 
for those injured victims who are harmed by losses that were made certain 
to occur at the hands of the policyholder.  
 
VII. SOLUTIONS: SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
At present, the most sensible solution to interpreting the 
applicability of either the intentional act fortuity clause or the criminal act 
fortuity clause is to only deny coverage when fortuity is truly frustrated –
when a loss has been made certain to occur by the purposeful conduct of a 
policyholder.  Otherwise, the clauses get bogged down in discourse about 
morality and about the rightful purpose of liability insurance itself.  
Insurance coverage decisions will then be more streamlined.  It will be 
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clearer to insurers, policyholders and third party accident victims that 
private liability insurance is presently designed to “pay the prankster but 
not the arsonist, and the risky fool but not the premeditated murderer.”73 
Such a practice will go a long way to closing the compensatory gap for 
injured accident victims so that the only accident victims left in it are those 
who miss out on compensation from a policyholder’s liability insurance 
because that policyholder acted to make a loss a certainty.  For that smaller 
group, another compensation solution needs to be devised, layered on top 
of the existing liability insurance scheme. 
It makes sense to interpret the criminal act fortuity clause as one 
that ousts liability insurance coverage for only specific-intent crimes where 
the policyholder had the intent to bring about certain loss.  To do otherwise 
is to doom the insurance interpretation analysis to a quagmire of morally 
muddy analytics.  The simple, literal answer to the question “when does the 
clause apply?” provides a troubling practical answer if coverage is ousted 
for any loss arising from some related criminal act of the policyholder.  
Courts have struggled with “what” criminal acts count as “criminal acts.”74 
Does a charge for speeding oust liability coverage?  What about 
negligence-based crimes or regulatory offences?  In the face of broad-based 
coverage for legal liability, a blanket exclusion for “anything catching the 
attention of the criminal law” can leave uninsured a wide variety of loss-
causing behavior, to the surprise of many policyholders (and probably a 
few insurers) ex post.  That leaves many accident victims in an 
unpredictable situation, with no source of compensation despite suffering a 
loss fortuitous to the policyholder.  Policyholders cannot adjust their 
behavior accordingly, as they are unable to predict what behavior is 
covered and what is not. 
That interpretive approach, however, does not comport with a 
literal reading of the criminal act fortuity clause.  Is the criminal act fortuity 
clause essentially doing the same job as the intentional act fortuity clause, 
rendering it superfluous?  One explanation for interpreting the clause in an 
expansive fashion is simple rigid contract law: the insurer put those words 
                                                                                                                          
73 Knutsen, supra note 8, at 115. 
74 See, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Drury, 445 S.E.2d 272, 273–74 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1994) (including the illegal use or possession of firecrackers as a “crime”); 
Harris v. Dunn, 45,619, p. 6–7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/10); 48 So. 3d 367, 372 
(stating that there was coverage for a policyholder, who struck a person who was 
getting back into a vehicle, despite guilty plea to misdemeanor battery offense); 
Herbert v. Talbot, 26, 009 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/94); 643 So. 2d 323 (indicating 
that policyholder’s cruelty to youth does not oust coverage);  
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in and, as insurance is a contract, the policyholder accepted those 
conditions when she purchased the policy and is now bound by them.  
Some courts have buttressed coverage denial using this contractual 
argument.75 This, however, ignores the fact that there is increasing 
evidence that insurance – especially liability insurance – is much more than 
a simple contract.76 At the very least, hinging on this contractual decision is 
access to compensation for the injured accident victim.  There is little room 
for such considerations in a literalist contractual interpretation of the 
criminal act fortuity clause.  That makes it problematic as an analytical 
approach.  By not at least addressing some potential purpose as to why the 
clause is in the policy, the accident victim’s compensation becomes the 
automatic sacrifice.  In an insurance law environment with pro-coverage 
interpretive tools like contra proferentem and reasonable expectations, 
many courts struggle against this literalist interpretation (perhaps for good 
reason). 
One possible explanation for the clause beyond a simplistic “these 
are what the words say,” as held by some courts, is that insurers mean to 
exclude from coverage any losses arising from criminal conduct because 
those losses are a riskier category than some other category of behavior.77 
Insurers are free to determine which risks they will underwrite and which 
they will not.  That is a market-based decision on the part of an insurer.  
However, second-guessing what an insurer “wants” to do, without evidence 
                                                                                                                          
75 See, e.g., Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 608 F.3d 388, 391 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (explaining that the plain language of criminal act exclusion had no 
intent requirement, so policyholder’s intent irrelevant at time of accident); Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Peasley, 932 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Wash. 1997) (holding that a criminal 
acts exclusion ousts coverage for reckless endangerment crime from accidental 
shooting, regardless of policyholder’s intent; “this court must enforce the Policy as 
written”). 
76 See generally, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Auto Insurance as Social Contract: 
Solving Automobile Insurance Coverage Disputes Through a Public Regulatory 
Framework, 48 ALBERTA L. REV. 715 (2011); Daniel Schwarcz, A Products 
Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 
41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203 (2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as 
Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010). 
77 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Berube, 854 A.2d 53, 57 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) 
(holding that an accidental gun discharge while getting into bed with loaded 
sawed-off rifle was a “criminal act”, even though determined to be an accident, 
because act risked injury to child in bed). 
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of an insurer’s drafting and underwriting intent, meets with some 
skepticism when the injured accident victim’s compensation is the 
collateral at stake in such a “guess.”  As has been explained above, today’s 
policyholders are often unable to ex ante predict what behavior will lead to 
a criminal charge, except for those obvious traditional, specific intent-based 
crimes like murder, assault, or arson. So if it is the insurer’s intention to 
exclude from coverage any and all losses arising out of a policyholder’s 
criminal actions, regardless of the policyholder’s subjective intent to bring 
about the loss, that intention, in today’s modern world, has to be based on 
something other than a moral concern for crime prevention, which, as 
mentioned above, this clause cannot effectively accomplish in any event. 
This explanation for the clause’s interpretation also ignores the fact 
that the very coverage offered is for legal liability arising from risky 
behavior: negligence.  There is no evidence that all behavior branded as 
“criminal” after the behavior occurs is any more or less costly to insure, as 
a category of behavior, than any negligent behavior.  It is not the type of 
exclusion that deals with an ex ante palpable effect on risk simply because 
the behavior is often categorized by the state as “criminal” after it occurs.  
This is different than exclusions in a homeowner’s liability policy for 
running a commercial business like a hair salon in the home without telling 
the insurer, thereby increasing the risk of loss by having more traffic in and 
out of the house and operating equipment not normally found in all homes.  
This is arguably different than other traditional exclusions for property 
insurance coverage like excluding losses arising from pollution or water 
damage or earthquake.  By contrast, those specific property insurance 
losses are the sort that are inherently more financially risky to insure 
because the losses, if realized, are more expensive and might have the 
potential to affect multiple policyholders at once, across multiple lines of 
insurance products.78 Such is not the case with a loss resulting from a 
criminal act. 
In addition, whether or not a certain type of conduct is criminal or 
not has no bearing on whether or not losses are arising in non-fortuitous 
ways.  Penal statutes are not written with an eye to what behavior actually 
realizes a certain loss but rather are conduct based, not results based.  
Crime is about something different than the presence or absence of 
insurable losses.  Insurers have no control over what crimes are included or 
                                                                                                                          
78 Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism 
Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 784 (2004) (warning of “clash events” which affect 
multiple policyholders across multiple lines of insurance). 
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not in penal statutes.  Furthermore, what is considered “criminal” behavior 
is ever-changing over time.  At the time an insurer drafts an insurance 
policy, behavior not considered criminal may, in the future, be deemed 
criminal.  A few decades ago, who could have predicted the crimes 
associated with the internet and identity theft?  Nowadays there are 
criminal investigations and prosecutions against teenagers for hacking into 
websites for fun or for cyber-bullying a classmate, despite the intent 
sometimes being to “tease.” 
So if the clause is ineffective at deterring crime and if it is 
essentially no riskier to insure losses arising from criminal acts as a distinct 
category of ex ante behavior than those arising from negligent acts in terms 
of size or frequency of losses, and if, in fact, the very behavior targeted by 
the clause is a mutating continuum of behavior as the criminal law changes 
over time, then why are insurers not providing coverage for losses arising 
from criminal acts?  Could it be that, as many courts note, crime is 
uninsurable?79 
This, too, does not bear out in reality.  Only a subsection of crime 
is conceptually uninsurable: those losses intentionally brought about by a 
criminal policyholder.  Other losses arising from criminal behavior are 
fortuitous and insurable, as long as the policyholder did not intend to bring 
about the loss.  In fact, there are many instances in insurance where crimes 
of one nature or another are insured and insurers still profit.  One example 
is property insurance for theft.  Another is coverage for a legal defense in a 
director’s and officer’s liability policy if the director or officer faces a 
criminal charge.  Some liability insurance policies insure policyholders 
against awards of punitive damages.  Still others provide liability coverage 
for vicarious liability for an employee’s intentional actions, including 
assault and sexual assault.  Liability insurers are still able to underwrite 
these risks and turn a profit in the insurance business. 
The only available rationale for the criminal act fortuity clause is 
that it enshrines the public policy notion – still relevant today – that 
                                                                                                                          
79 See, e.g., Minn. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854, 866 (Pa. 
2004) (maintaining that insurance policy was not designed to protect a drug dealer, 
so no coverage existed when a houseguest died of a heroin overdose); Am. Family 
Mut. Ins. Group v. Kostaneski, 688 N.W.2d 410, 415 (S.D. 2004) (insuring 
intentional wrongdoers is against state public policy, so criminal exclusion is 
valid); Unified W. Grocers, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 371 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 
1243 (D. Haw. 2005) (holding that one cannot insure restitution of an “ill-gotten 
gain” under California law), rev’d, 457 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2006).  
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insurance will not be used by a criminal to profit from his crime.80 It also 
assists in an evidentiary fashion by ousting coverage for specific-intent 
crimes so that tortious intent need not be proven by the insurer seeking to 
remove coverage.  The work has already been done in the criminal case.  
So the clause acts as a sort of doctrinal shortcut to proving the necessary 
intent required in making coverage determinations.  As long as the 
policyholder is not profiting from a crime, or intentionally causing a loss 
that is the result of a crime, the clause’s purpose is upheld. 
If the purpose of insurance is seen as a wealth protection product 
only, this public policy notion of the clause fits with more modern fortuity 
concerns.  The only way a policyholder insured by liability insurance could 
ever “profit” from his crimes (here, “profit” meaning enjoying the wealth 
protection aspect of the insurance) would be if he brought about a certain 
loss.  So a bar brawler picks a fight and slugs another patron because he 
knows that if he injures that patron and is sued, at least his liability insurer 
will cover the losses.  If, however, the policyholder did not commit a crime 
with intent to cause the insured loss, there is no way the policyholder could 
“profit.”  The act of profiting itself requires some implicit intent that the 
policyholder aims to profit from his actions. 
There is, of course, a valid argument that the liability insurance 
policyholder could never “profit” from the insurance proceeds because the 
insurance proceeds go to the third party accident victim, not the 
policyholder.  Because the wealth protection purpose of insurance can 
compete with the compensation function of insurance in the liability 
insurance context, the public policy rationale for the criminal act fortuity 
clause is weakened.  The historical nature of the clause, arising out of 
moral and public policy concerns, does not port well into the modern 
liability insurance landscape.  It functions, as has been shown, as a very 
nearly always unbalanced concept whereby so much law and policy mash 
together and the result of which is very often a compensation gap for an 
injured accident victim. 
The simplest solution to fairly and predictably balance concerns 
with the compensation gap while still maintaining efficacy of fortuity 
clauses as written is to interpret fortuity clauses as clauses that are triggered 
by fortuity concerns which frustrate the insurance relationship.  To do 
anything else is to introduce unpredictability in the form of morality-based 
mutable legal concepts from tort and criminal law into an insurance 
                                                                                                                          
80 See Minn. Fire & Cas. Co., 855 A.2d at 869; Am. Family Mut. Ins. Group, 
688 N.W.2d at 415; Unified W. Grocers, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. 
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interpretation exercise.  To that end, the intentional act fortuity clause 
should be interpreted so as to remove coverage for a loss only when the 
policyholder subjectively intends to bring about the harm that was caused 
by the intentional act.  Similarly, the criminal act fortuity clause should 
only oust coverage for a loss when a policyholder subjectively intends the 
harm that was caused by the criminal act.  Otherwise, coverage would be 
removed for fortuitous losses at the expense of an injured accident victim’s 
compensatory needs.  By interpreting these clauses as requiring a 
subjective causative element, the exercise restricts coverage removal to 
only those instances where the policyholder could actually subjectively 
have altered behavior to avoid the loss, thereby ensuring maximum 
effectiveness for moral hazard insurance concerns.  Otherwise, the 
deterrent effect (if any) of the clause is ineffective and over-broad.  This 
sort of approach would prevent fortuity clauses from inefficiently morphing 
into morality clauses.  It would also more fairly balance the wealth 
protection aspect of insurance with the compensatory needs of accident 
victims while still not doing violence to the current language of the 
respective clauses.  Litigation and insurance costs would be saved as a 
result.  The compensation gap for fortuity victims would significantly 
narrow to predictably include only those harmed by specific-intent crimes 
or subjective intentional conduct on the part of the policyholder.  While this 
still would leave some victims without compensation, it would at least 
provide a fixed category of people so that a sensible social solution could 
then be crafted, if necessary. 
 
VIII. ADDRESSING THE COMPENSATION GAP 
 
To address the remaining compensatory gap, it would be necessary 
to go further than what can be done by interpreting the presently worded 
insurance policies through a lens of fortuity.  One must examine the web of 
accident compensation as it is presently constituted and perhaps reform it.  
There may well be reason to do this, as the injured victims comprising this 
particular gap would be those who were injured as a result of particularly 
extreme intentional or criminal actions on the part of the policyholder: the 
victims of assaults, attempted murders, actual murders and sexual 
assaults.81 This group of victims would likely exhibit particularly 
                                                                                                                          
81 See, e.g., Wriggins, supra note 36 (stating the need to view compensatory 
issues with the perspective of the injured party, not just the view of the 
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catastrophic and troubling injuries that, under tort, would typically be 
deserving of a significant level of compensation.  As Rick Swedloff and 
Jennifer Wriggins point out, to ignore these victims in the compensatory 
gap is not only expensive, but doing so impinges on collective social 
conscience as well.  A few solutions exist. 
One solution would be to incentivize insurers to market an add-on 
portion for a variety of liability insurance policies specifically designed to 
pay the policyholder in the event she is injured by another party and cannot 
collect from that party’s liability insurance because of the operation of a 
fortuity clause in that other party’s policy.  The add-on “fortuity clause 
insurance” could function similar to uninsured automobile motorist 
coverage, as an extra endorsement or rider on automobile, homeowners, 
personal, professional, or commercial liability insurance.  For an additional 
premium, the policyholder could claim compensation from her own 
liability insurance policy if she found herself without compensation due to 
an inability to trigger a tortfeasor’s liability insurance because of the 
conduct of the tortfeasor wrongdoer who harmed her.82 The risk of being 
found in the compensation gap due to the operation of a fortuity clause 
could be unbundled and sold as a separate insurance add-on.83 While the 
payout under this type of insurance add-on may not be small when it 
occurs, it is certainly a very proscribed situation far less likely to occur than 
a standard automobile accident or any mishap that triggers homeowners 
insurance.  In fact, its instance of trigger might be quite rare, 
comparatively.  There may be a real market in this add-on, to the benefit of 
insurers, because people have a somewhat irrational fear of being harmed 
by crime.  If offered at a modest price, most policyholders might well 
purchase it. 
Of course, this solution only benefits those who are covered by 
liability insurance in the first place.  While the group would be obviously 
large and include all drivers and homeowners, some particularly vulnerable 
members of society are simply not covered by any liability insurance.  
These are most often the poor, the unemployed, or those who lose liability 
                                                                                                                          
perpetrator); Swedloff, supra note 36 (documenting the challenging compensatory 
issues with fortuity victims). 
82 Similar to Rick Swedloff’s “uninsured assailant” insurance, except not a 
mandatory form of insurance. Swedloff, supra note 36, at 759–60. 
83 See Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE L.J. 1285 (2011) 
(advocating for more creative ways of unbundling traditional risk packages by 
unbundling the risk in innovative units). 
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insurance coverage for another reason (like failing to pay their premiums).  
For those, another solution would have to be invented if they, too, are to 
exit the compensatory gap left by the unpredictable application of fortuity 
clauses. 
There are two potential solutions to address the needs of this still 
smaller group of uncompensated accident victims who are not themselves 
covered by liability insurance and who did not purchase the first party 
fortuity clause insurance add-on.  In the face of a triggered fortuity clause, 
liability insurers could be legislatively forced to provide compensation to 
the victims of criminal and intentional conduct.84 In exchange, insurers 
would be allowed to subrogate against their own policyholders in an 
attempt to recoup their losses from the actual wrongdoer.  This provides at 
least some credence to the operation of the fortuity clause.  However, the 
actual success of that subrogation exercise is speculative.  If we know that 
most policyholders do not have sufficient personal assets to cover a civil 
judgment, why would insurer subrogation against an insured produce any 
better results?  There would be substantial collection costs on the part of 
insurers, for somewhat sketchy proceeds as a result of the exercise.  
Another solution to assist uninsured individuals who are left with 
no compensation as a result of a policyholder’s triggered fortuity clause is 
for the government to create a new socialized compensation mechanism for 
these victims – a “Victims of Intentional Harm” program.  Some 
government body would operate a program that steps in to compensate 
those left in the gaps created by fortuity clauses.  The program would be 
funded by a small levy on the sale of every liability insurance policy.  This 
is essentially the same as insurers providing add-on fortuity clause 
insurance except mandated in a socialized fashion.  It would be paid for by 
all policyholders but would be accessed by those who could not access 
some other compensation source (i.e. those who did not have add-on 
fortuity clause insurance).  If the private market add-on fortuity clause 
insurance failed in that it was not purchased by sufficient policyholders, 
this may be a workable alternative to that solution as well.  The 
government body could also be given the right to subrogate against a 
wrongdoer, if any assets were attainable.  Of course, there would be 
administrative costs to the program and the difficulty of determining the 
                                                                                                                          
84 Similar to, but broader than, Jennifer Wriggins’ proposed Domestic 
Violence Torts Insurance Plan, which she proposes should be tacked onto 
automobile liability insurance in order to provide compensation for a wide cross-
section of victims of domestic violence. See Wriggins, supra note 36. 
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price of the levy on the sale of liability insurance policies.  But one would 
expect the cost of operation to be at a minimum due to the limited amount 
of victims who would have to resort to the fund, especially if there were 
some reasonable limits on compensation provided by the fund. 
Finally, a more fundamental solution to fortuity clauses would be 
to legislatively outlaw fortuity clauses in liability insurance.  This step 
places the compensatory purpose of insurance squarely at the forefront, 
well ahead of the wealth protection purpose.  It enshrines private insurance 
as a fundamental part of the accident compensation system.  However, it 
also passes the costs of paying for non-fortuitous losses onto all liability 
insurance policyholders.  Providing coverage for losses certain to occur 
appears counter to standard insurance risk fundamentals and, frankly, 
insurance profitability.  
But such a move is not impossible.85 Indeed, in Canada, the 
decision was made to disallow fortuity clauses in automobile liability 
insurance, such that any act of automobile use, no matter how criminal or 
intentional, results in compensation for the accident victim via the 
wrongdoer’s liability insurance policy.86 The result has been that the costs 
of these allegedly certain losses are spread amongst the risk pool of insured 
drivers.  While premiums may have increased as a result, automobile 
insurance is not catastrophically unaffordable in that country.  The policy 
move was to favor victim compensation over wealth protection or even 
fortuity concepts in the auto accident sphere.  Driving was considered a 
dangerous activity and the driving public would have to self-fund a source 
of victim compensation within a liability insurance market. 
The real question here is this: if such was the thinking for the 
victims of automobile insurance accidents, why is there not similar thinking 
going on for the victims of crimes and other intentional acts?  Is the move 
from auto victim to assault victim really so fundamentally different that the 
former is more deserving of a compensation scheme whereas the latter is 
not?  Or is it simply because it is more administratively easy to create a 
compensation scheme with a pool of risk-creators like automobile drivers 
                                                                                                                          
85 And, in fact, in the automobile context especially, a number of American 
courts have alluded to the importance of compensating third-party accident victims 
as a reason for allowing coverage despite the insured’s intentional conduct. See, 
e.g., Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 841 A.2d 858 (Md. 2004); 
Proformance Ins. Co. v. Jones, 887 A.2d 146 (N.J. 2005); Tapp v. Perciful, 120 
P.3d 480 (Okla. 2005). 
86 See, e.g., Knutsen, supra note 8, at 80. 
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who would be more comfortable to pay into such a scheme for the privilege 
of operating a dangerous motor vehicle?  If that is the case, then why is 
auto accident risk creation different than any other risk creation behavior 




Keeping fortuity clauses firmly grounded in fortuity-based thinking 
would help to restrict whatever compensation gap does exist for fortuity 
victims injured by fortuitous losses.  That means that the intentional act and 
criminal act fortuity clauses require a subjective interpretation.  Morality 
needs to be taken out of the equation.  That would also save significant 
litigation costs in the solving of fortuity clause insurance coverage disputes.  
Those fortuity victims still left in the compensation gap would be a smaller, 
more predictable group to be expected in keeping with the principle of 
fortuity in insurance.  But the situation is no less tragic.  In a society which 
relies so heavily on private, market-based insurance as the main 
compensatory source for accident victims, it is surprising that, of all 
victims, these fortuity victims frequently have the least options for 
compensation.  Some other solution for them is required. 
Such a solution, or indeed any solutions proposed in this final 
section, would require not only insurer buy-in, but serious political buy-in 
as well.  They are social solutions to a social problem.  Such change is 
never easy.  Staid institutions would have to change.  But it is important to 
keep in mind that the genesis of these fortuity clauses in the first place was 
a concern over social problems.  These clauses designed to circumvent 
morality problems associated with insurance products are now themselves 
causing other morality problems in the form of unfairly and unpredictably 
leaving a serious and expensive compensation gap in society for a sub-set 
of injured accident victims.  Perhaps then the argument that insurers need 
to be part of the social solution is a reasonable one.  It is a social move that 
will require a shift in thinking from the purpose of insurance as wealth 
protection to that of victim compensation.  This Article has outlined the 
importance of balancing that tension.  Perhaps that shift is not as difficult to 
make in today’s society as it was when liability insurance first surfaced. 
 
 
  
